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BOOK REVIEW
Good days for Russia’s newest oil generals,
bad days for Russia
By Alexander Cooley  November 7, 2012
Alexander Cooley is a professor at Barnard College and author of "Great Games, Local Rules:
The New Great Power Contest for Central Asia."
Thane Gustafson, a Georgetown University professor of former Soviet studies, offers what is
likely to be the definitive account of these eventful years in a rich history drawing from both
independent sources and first-hand experiences. General readers may initially balk at
Gustafson’s penchant for detail, but the book is worth sticking with as it tracks long-forgotten
but important events and personalities over the past two decades. Following the book’s themes
forward, Gustafson offers grim conclusions about where Russia’s continued reliance on oil is
taking the country.Russia’s political evolution has long been linked to oil. In the waning days
of the Soviet Union, regional titans who we can call “oil generals” wielded power and earned
immense fortunes based on the petroleum under their control. But when the country
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collapsed, they lost their footing, and the oil industry became melded with state power under
leader Vladimir Putin.
For Russian oil enterprises, part of survival in the chaotic
post-Soviet transition meant the fleet-footed establishment
of unheard-of finance divisions had to manage the flow of
cash through a time of price ceilings and government
vouchers. Then there was the appearance of foreign oil
companies, with their alien corporate styles and
organizational cultures, a clash that ultimately produced the
preferred institutional form of international cooperation—
the joint venture.
Gustafson’s style of institutional analysis subtly connects
the dots of all this, using key personalities, legal
developments, technical issues, sectoral geography and local
agendas to profile the era. Ultimately, private companies far
out-performed state-run producers, increasing oil
production by two-thirds from 1999 to 2004; state-dominated Rosneft raised its production by
a mere quarter. Private companies such as Yukos managed this feat by hiring outside service
companies and employing new technologies, while breaking traditional Soviet-era
commitments to supporting general social welfare in oil-producing cities.
Under Putin, the industry fell under far greater state control. Rosneft was transformed into a
national champion and Yukos was brought to heel. According to Gustafson, even during a
boom period for private companies, the Russian state never fully exited the industry,
maintaining legal rights in crucial areas such as field development, pipeline ownership,
exploration licensing and domestic distribution. They provided the basis through which the
Kremlin reasserted itself under Putin.
With so much nuance and careful tracing, the book is striking for one deviation and one
general omission. The deviation is an idiosyncratic explanation of the “Yukos affair”—Putin’s
dismembering of what was then the country’s largest and most successful company, and the
jailing of its brazenly defiant owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Gustafson explains how Yukos’s relentless drive for higher production alienated long-time oil
players who likened Khodorkovsky’s practices to the late Soviet-era desecration of oilfields.
Khodorkovsky seemed to deliberately do everything to gall both the Kremlin and his oilfield
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rivals. He used a sophisticated system of so-called transfer-pricing, sending Yukos cash into
special tax zones within and outside of Russia. Khodorkovsky openly bucked the Kremlin in
planning an unsanctioned pipeline with CNPC, the Chinese oil company. He lobbied within
the Duma for a new tax regime and giving high profile interviews that criticized the Russian
state’s capacities and regulatory role.
But after setting the stage, Gustafson quickly dismisses some of the prevailing explanations of
the Yukos crackdown, such as renewed state predation, Yukos’s flirtations with Chevron and
ExxonMobil, and a Putin emboldened by high oil prices. Instead, Gustafson posits that
Khodorkovsky’s brash style, and his willingness to flout Putin’s dictum against businessmen
practicing politics, tipped the scales and prompted decisive Kremlin action against the
oligarch: “Without the factor of personality, in short, the contest and the privatized oil
industry would arguably not have descended into such a bitter confrontation among a small
group of men, which in turn served as the convenient instrument for one leadership faction to
gain the edge in the making of policy.”
The spotlight on Khodorkovsky’s personality breaks from the book’s otherwise unrelenting
focus on the interplay between institutional evolution and political incentives. It seems
unnecessarily narrow, given that the Yukos affair is viewed as a key event in Russian political
history precisely because it encapsulates so many hallmarks of Putin’s Russia—the Kremlin’s
use new authoritarian techniques of control, its resolve to consolidate control over the
strategically viewed energy sector, its compulsive attention to public relations and acts of
political defiance, and its near obsessive pushback against Western actors allegedly bent on
undermining Russian sovereignty.
The international dimension, curiously, also seems to get short shrift in favor of the domestic
political economic analysis, although with a book weighing in at over 500 pages, it is difficult
to fault the author for the omission. Gustafson provides great detail about the engagement and
limitations of foreign companies, including an illuminating account of BP’s travails. But the
book does not mention important episodes like the opening of the politically maligned Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (the first major post-Soviet project to bypass Russian territory); the
political impact of Gazprom-pricing disputes with Ukraine and accompanying pipeline
closures; the Russia-Georgia War of 2008; or China’s 2009 emergency $25 billion loan package
to Rosneft and Transneft.
More broadly, it is difficult to disentangle the domestic side of Russia’s new state energy
strategy from its foreign policy towards Europe, its effort to control energy development and
transit in the Caucasus and Central Asia, its use of energy discounts as an instrument of
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Russian-led regional integration, and its complex dealings with China. Gustafson’s insights
would be of great interest, as would his assessment of whether the Kremlin has succeeded in
wielding energy as a strategic weapon.
In his concluding chapters, Gustafson returns to earlier themes to offer a relatively pessimistic
account of the sector’s prospects. Since oil is more than likely central to Russia’s general
economic health, the projection is a gloomy one for the country indeed.
It does not get better, Gustafson says. Russian oil companies have concentrated on improving
extraction of existing fields through conventional methods, but are ill-prepared and
undercapitalized to implement the more costly techniques necessary to recover the peripheral
oil that is critical for maintaining production. If Russia wishes to modernize, it must do better
on the oil patch while also bucking the oil-curse. Such reforms will reduce the government
take of oil income. The outcome? According to Gustafson, another round of conflict for control
over the sector.
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